Do we follow the money? The drivers of migration across regions in the EU by AndrÃƒÂ©s RodrÃƒÂ­guez-Pose & Tobias Ketterer
DO WE FOLLOW THE MONEY?








a Department of Geography and Environment




IMDEA Social Sciences Institute
Madrid
E-mail: a.rodriguez-pose@lse.ac.uk
a Leverhulme Centre for Research on Globalisation and Economic Policy
University of Nottingham
University Park
Nottingham NG7 2RD 
E-mail: lextk7@nottingham.ac.ukii
DO  WE  FOLLOW  THE  MONEY?  THE  DRIVERS  OF  MIGRATION 
ACROSS REGIONS IN THE EU
Abstract
Most  immigration  theories  tend to highlight  that  migration  follows  wealth and economic 
dynamism, but is this also the case across regions in Europe? The aim of the paper is to 
investigate whether migrants in Europe indeed follow the money and to contrast this with a 
variety of potential alternative explanations, including the presence of migrants from a similar 
origin. The analysis is based on panel data estimations including 133 European regions over a 
time period of 17 years. Different lag structures have been employed in order to distinguish 
between short- and long-run effects. The results cast some doubt about the prominence of 
pecuniary factors as a determinant of cross regional migration in Europe, with little evidence 
to support  the  idea  that migration  follows economic  dynamism.  Network  effects, human 
capital related-, and ‘territorially embedded’ innovation enhancing regional characteristics, by 
contrast, seem to play a much stronger role than hitherto considered. The study also reveals
important differences among EU countries in the factors which determine regional migration.
Keywords: Inter-regional migration, mobility, regional economic growth, social networks, 
regions, Europe1
1. Introduction 
How  important  are  pecuniary  incentives  for  migration?  According  to  most  migration 
theories, they are crucial. Early theories relied heavily on regional differences in income and 
living standards as the main motivation for migration, in general, and for rural-to-urban 
migration,  in particular (Hicks,  1932; Sjaastadt,  1962; Todaro,  1968,  1969;  Harris  and 
Todaro, 1970). Since then, money and jobs have remained the magnets for migrants in 
migration  theory (e.g.  Bhagwati  and  Srinivasan  1974;  Fields,  1979; Lundborg,  1991; 
Schmidt, Stilz and Zimmermann, 1994). Most traditional empirical studies on migration 
have thus tended to focus on differences in living standards and economic dynamismas the 
key factors behind geographical  mobility (Greenwood,  1997;  Haapanen,  2000; Puhani, 
2001). 
Interregional migration patterns within Europe in the last decades fly, however, in the face 
of  these  theories.  Despite  substantial and  persistent regional  disparities  in  wealth,
unemployment  rates, and economic  performance  (Puga,  2002)  and,  notwithstanding 
freedom of mobility across much of the EU, migration rates within the EU have remained 
relatively  subdued  (Décressin  and  Fatàs,  1995;  Fatàs,  2000;  Obstfeld  and  Peri,  2000; 
Puhani, 2001). According to Huber (2004: 619) “it takes several years or decades before 
regional unemployment disparities are evened by migration”. So, if differences in wealth, 
wages, and employment levels are critical for migration, why has interregional mobility in 
the EU remained low for so long? Do migrants really follow the money as predicted by 
traditional theory? Or are other factors, such as the presence of social networks or place-
based  regional  externalities,  as  important,  if  not  more,  in  determining  the decision  by 
Europeans to migrate?2
These are the  questions that  this paper  aims  to address.  Using  migration data  for 133 
European  regions during the period  1990-2006,  we  examine  the  relevance of pecuniary 
factors in determining migration trends, by estimating static and dynamic panel data models 
with heteroscedasticity robust fixed effects estimators. The objective is to determine, first, 
the relevance of pecuniary motivations and, second, to evaluate whether regional wealth, 
economic dynamism, and job availability are more important than the presence of other 
migrants, social networks, or other additional regional characteristics in shaping migration 
flows across Europe’s regions.
In order to achieve this aim the paper first briefly reviews the theoretical literature on the 
relationship  between  pecuniary  rewards  and  migration  before  contrasting  the potential 
strength of this relationship with thatofother possible migration drivers (Section 2). Section 
3  presents a discussion  of  the data, introduces  the variables used in  the model,  via  a 
descriptive analysis, and finally provides the empirical specification and justification of the 
econometric approach. The empirical results are presented and interpreted in Section 4. 
Section 5 concludes that cross-regional migration in the EU in recent years is more the 
result  of  past  migration  trends,  human  capital  related  and  ‘territorially-embedded’ 
externalities than of simple  differences  in  wealth  across  territories  and  that the factors 
behind regional migration in Europe vary significantly from country to country.
2. Theoretical considerations: money and other migration drivers 
Since the early work of Hicks (1932), financial rewards to individual mobility have been 
regarded  as  the  fundamental  magnet  for  migrants. According  to  Hicks  (1932:  76),
“differences in net economic advantages, chiefly differences in wages, are the main causes 
of migration”. Migrants would regard differences in wages and expected incomes across 
territories as  an  opportunity  to  improve personal  wealth,  welfare, and  living standards 3
(Sjaastad, 1962). According to these theories, migrants move in expectation of a higher 
utility in the place of destination (Sjaastad, 1962; Greenwood, 1997), making differences in 
wages  or  other  forms  of  incomes  across  territories  the  driving  force  behind  regional 
migration. Consequently, the higher the differential of region-specific earning opportunities
and the higher the probability of  finding a  job  in  the  region of  destination,  the  higher 
migration flows between home- and host-territory (Harris and Todaro, 1970).
The source of unequal earning opportunities across regions has traditionally been rooted in 
differences in input factor endowment levels (Lewis, 1954; Ranis and Fei, 1961; Öberg, 
1997). In this neoclassical framework, geographical differences in demand and supply of 
labour trigger migration. Territories with an abundant labour supply, relative to capital, have 
low marginal returns to labour, whereas territories with relative scarce labour endowments 
are characterized by higher labour returns. The resulting differences in marginal products 
lead to different wage levels across territories and are therefore considered as the main 
stimulus behind labour, mobility. Under conditions of perfect competition, perfect labour-
and capital mobility, classical migration theory predicts people to move from low- to high-
labour-productivity  regions, leading  to  an  increase  of  migrants’  utility  due  to  higher 
expected  net  income  levels  in  high-productivity  areas  (Borjas,  1989;  Bauer  and 
Zimmerman, 1997; Öberg, 1997).
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However,  when  assessing the potential of  maximizing  their  lifetime  earnings,  would-be
migrants have also been found to weight their future career benefits againstthe financial and 
psychological  costs  of leaving  their  place  of  origin  (Lee,  1972;  Tassinopoulos  and 
                                                  
1 Further assumptions of the neoclassical model are full employment, homogenous supply of labour, perfect 
information and transparency, and the absence of transportation costs (Sjaastad, 1962). Moreover, traditional 
migration theories also predict wage convergence between host and source regions which finally result in an 
equalization of real wages across all regions (Todaro, 1969).4
Kristensen, 1998). This cost-benefit calculation involves aspects of investments in human 
capital. Given certain skill-related attributes, potential migrants choose to move to areas 
where they believe they can be most productive. However, before reaping the expected 
benefits, mostly in the form of higher wages, migrants have to make certain efforts. These 
efforts may  include  learning a new  culture and  language,  the  costs of adapting to  new 
working systems, the psychological costs of leaving old social ties behind and forging new 
ones, but also a number of material costs in the form of travelling and maintenance costs 
when looking for a new job (Massey et al., 1993). Theory predicts that potential migrants 
are likely to factor in possible short- or medium-term losses, due to a lack of complete 
information  or  due  to  the  assimilation  to  a new  environment  and  labour  market, in 
expectation  of  greater  returns  down  the  line  (Borjas,  Bronars,  Trejo,  1992).  When 
considering  to  move  would-be  migrants  will estimate  the  benefits  of  earnings  and 
employment  opportunities  both  in  the  home  and  in t he  potential  destination  markets, 
“deduct the costs of making the move, and choose whichever option maximises the net 
present value of lifetime earnings” (Tassinopoulos and Kristensen, 1998: 8). This implies 
that regions offering the highest pecuniary and financial returns to migration remain those 
more  attractive  for potential  migrants  (Lee,  1972;  Pekkala,  2002,  2003).  Traditional 
migration theory thus “typically leads to the conclusion that people migrate “[…] from 
regions experiencing a  downward economic  trend to  regions experiencing  an economic 
expansion” (Hooghe et al., 2008: 478). These views have been frequently corroborated by 
empirical  studies.  Linking  expected  future  earnings  to  economic  dynamism  Haapanen 
(2000),  for  instance, shows that  internal  migrants  in F inland  are  more  like  to  move to 
economic prospering regions and that the elasticity of the migration propensity to dynamic
regions is over twice as large as thatofperipheral regions.5
Wage-based migration motives are complemented by financial incentives based on other 
forms of income, such as state transfers or other public amenities. High redistributional 
transfers may on the one hand, provide an insurance against the risk of income losses (e.g. 
due to unemployment) and on the other, increase the overall availability of public goods. 
Both  aspects  will increase  the  utility of  (risk-averse)  individuals.  The  consequences on 
aggregated migration flows are twofold. Whereas potential migrants may be attracted by 
higher social welfare spending in the host territories, individuals already benefiting from 
relatively high public social spending may be less willing to leave their places of origin 
(Boyd, 1989; Haapanen  and  Ritsilä,  2007).  Day  (1992),  for  example,  shows that inter-
provincial migration flows in Canada are significantly influenced by provincial government 
expenditure policies in unemployment insurance benefits and direct transfer payments to 
individuals.  The  magnitude  and variability of  future  lifetime  earnings  is, however, also 
subject to a certain degree of uncertainty regarding institutional aspects in the new host area 
(Ghatak et al.,  1996). Informational  asymmetries  regarding  the  disposability  of  public 
goods,  health  care,  schooling, or  the  quality  of  life,  as  well  as, uncertainties  about 
employment opportunities and unobservable wages in more advanced regions, may prevent 
people from leaving economically less attractive regions. Informational asymmetries may 
also be strongly conditioned by ‘distance’ (Greenwood, 1975, 1997; Zimmermann, 2005).
The larger the distance between home and host area, the greater the risks and costs of 
movement. Conversely, information about labour market conditions and social amenities is 
expected to increase the closer the potential destination (Zimmermann, 2005).
The motives to migrate by an individual are, however, not only influenced by the level of
potential future earnings and public transfers, but also by a number of other factors. The 
probability of  finding a job  in the host region plays,  for example, a crucial role. High 
unemployment  rates, as  well  as  high  ratios  of  long-term  unemployment,  may both6
discourage  migration  in-flows  and simultaneously  act as an  important  ‘push-factor’  for 
potential migrants (Todaro, 1969; Pissarides and McMaster, 1990; Jackman and Savouris, 
1992). Migration can therefore be considered as an intrinsic part of the search for jobs 
(Gordon, 1985; Décressin, 1994; Huber, 2004). The likelihood of migrating and finding a 
job are highly conditioned by the levelof education of the individual (Fields, 1975; Pekkala, 
2003; Zimmermann, 2005). Regions possessing industries employing predominantly highly 
educated  people  should,  therefore,  attract  more  migrants  relative  to  regions  with 
prevailingly  low-skilled  labour.  Burda  and Wyplosz  (1992),  for  instance, show,  in the 
context of East-West European migration, that the most likely movers are the young and the 
highly-educated. Rodríguez-Pose and Viltata-Bufí (2005: 559) also find that economically 
more dynamic regions and “those with a stronger foothold in the knowledge economy” tend 
to have the greatest capacity to attract highly educated people. As a result, the decision to 
migrate seems to be affected by a combination of individual and regional characteristics
stretching beyond the usual scope of traditional economic migration drivers. 
Place-based  regional  conditions are other  factors behind  migration  which are  attracting 
greater  interest  recently.  Favourable socio-economic  features,  for  example, are  likely  to 
allow  migrants  a fast transition  into  jobs  that best suit their  abilities and to accelerate 
assimilation  in a  new  structural  and  administrative  system.  Favourable  human  capital 
endowments  and  high  regional  development  levels  also  increase  the  probability  of 
individuals boosting their own productivity and wages through interaction with others in the 
region  (Rudd,  2000; Rodríguez-Pose  and  Tselios,  2011).  Individuals  moving to highly-
skilled and well-off regions will therefore benefit from knowledge-spillovers. The presence 
of large groups of poor and educationally disadvantaged individuals in a region, by contrast, 
will lower  overall productivity  and  therefore  also  the  region’s  attractiveness  towards 
potential migrants (Di Addario and Patachini, 2008).7
Other socio-economic features shaping regional migration flows are related to the structure 
and the demographic composition of the population. Age has a significant influence on 
migration  decisions (Massey et  al.,  1993;  Tassinopoulos  and  Kristensen,  1998).  The 
propensity to migrate considerably decreases with age (Zimmermann, 2005). Hence regions 
with a relatively young population structure will have a higher out-flow of (young) people. 
In addition, tight conditions on local labour markets, especially for young people, could 
enhance migration (Cairns and Menz, 2007).  
Past migration trends also play a centralrole in determining the appeal of any given territory 
for new migrants. The presence of migrants of a similar origin will not only determine the 
direction of migration flows, but also their persistence. Social network linkages stretching 
from home to host regions will considerably reduce the costs and risks of migrating for 
certain groups (Massey et al., 1998). The presence of groups from the same geographical 
origin in any given region will allow future members of those communities to gain easier 
access  to jobs  and  reduce  the  costs  of assimilation  in new  cultural  or  administrative 
structures (Massey  et al.,  1993).  This  may  trigger  path  dependence,  whereby  current 
migration flows may be substantially influenced by the magnitude and direction of past 
migration  movements, reflecting  potential  chain  migration  effects  at  the  ethnic  group, 
village, or even family level (Massey and Gracia, 1987; Bauer and Zimmermann, 1997; 
Shah and Menon, 1999).  Group, family, and household ties may also make migration a 
collectivedecision. Collective decision-making by larger units of related people, rather than 
by isolated individuals, may serve as a means to pool resources and to ensure a higher 
overall  expected  income,  lower  risk,  while  contributing to  loosen  several  (capital) 
constraints due to various market failures, albeit often at the expense of individual freedom 
of choice (Katz and Stark, 1988; Taylor, 1986; Stark, 1991). As a result, individual earning 8
opportunities may be affected by household externalities (Mincer, 1978; Rodríguez-Pose 
and Tselios, 2010).
Urban amenities and quality of life have also featured prominently in migration analyses, 
especially by North American scholars (e.g. Florida, 2002; Ferguson et al., 2007; Partridge, 
2010). The beauty and accessibility of the natural environment or the vibrancy of a region’s 
cultural live have been highlighted as potentially the main magnet for the attraction of talent 
and  skills  (Partridge,  2010),  although  their  influence  may  be  waning  in  recent  times 
(Partridge et al., 2011).
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Finally, structural features of the local economy may also affect specific types of skill-
related  labour  demand and  therefore  migration  patterns across  regions.  The dual  labour 
market theory (Piore, 1979) highlights that migration is driven by a constant demand of 
migrant labour related to the economic structure of a geographical area. Different territorial 
characteristics are therefore likely to shape a region’s economic structure and thereby its 
intrinsic labour demands (Massey et al., 1998). The structure and absolute size of the local 
economy are important elements in attracting certain types of migrants and determining the 
composition of migration flows. The pattern and size of regional economies is also strongly 
linked to aspects of market potential. Workers tend to be attracted by regions where the
market potential is high and price levels are low, whereas firms tend to cluster in areas with 
a beneficial access to labour demand. These forces underline that migrants are likely to be 
attracted by  economic  agglomerated areas  with smaller  price  indexes  and  consequently 
                                                  
2 Amenities may play a lower role in the case of Europe than in the US. In a densely urbanised environment, 
easy access to natural beauty is confined to a more limited number of areas. Average temperatures across the 
continent  are  also  less  extreme  than  in  North  America  and,  given  its  long  history,  availability  of  c ultural 
amenities  more  homogenous  and  of ten  directly  related  to  city  size  and  agglomeration.  Hence,  migration 
analyses  considering  amenities  in  Europe  of ten  reach  contradictory  results:  while,  for  the  case  of  I taly, 
Dalmazzo and de Blasio (2007) find that local cultural amenities attract skilled workers, they seem to play no 
role in decisions to migrate  from graduates in the South of the country (D’Antonio and Scarlato, 2007). As a 
consequence, amenities are not included as an independent variable in our analysis.9
higher real wages (Ottaviano and Puga, 1998). Different degrees of industry agglomeration 
and market potential may therefore influence consumers’ and workers’ decisions to move. 
Higher expected real wages in agglomerated areas due to competition among firms, as well 
as greater diversity, will enhance the pull of agglomerated regions for migrants (Surico, 
2003; Pekkala, 2003). However, different views coexist regarding the effects of industry 
agglomeration on wages and on the spatial concentration of workers. 
How important are net income advantages or pecuniary incentives relative to other factors
for migration? Given the presence of a whole range of socio-economic and region specific 
structural characteristics which affect migration decisions on an individual-, household-, or 
group-level,  the  proclaimed  predominance  of  wage  driven  migration  incentives  seems 
questionable.  There  are,  however,  relatively  few empirical  studies  contrasting the 
importance of different income indicators vis-à-vis other socio-economic elements as the 
drivers of migration on an EU-wide regional level. This study aims to close this gap in the 
literature by examining which place-specific factors drive migration at a European scale and 
whether, as expected by the dominant theories of migration, pecuniary factors are more 
important than alternative explanations behind migration trends across regions in the EU.
3. Data, variables andeconometric specification
3.1 Data and variables
In order to test the importance of pecuniary returns to migration across the EU’s regions and 
to contrast these findings with a number of additional factors influencing migration, we 
follow the work of Sjaastad (1962), Todaro (1969), and Pissarides and McMaster (1990). 
This  approach,  which  mostly  addresses  features  of  traditional  migration  drivers,  is 
complemented  by  the  use  of  methods  introducing  regional  and  ‘place-based’  socio-10
economic externalities (Rodríguez-Pose and Crescenzi, 2008; Rodríguez-Pose and Tselios, 
2010). In order to measure migration, we introduce the net migration rate, defined as the 
difference between annual immigration and emigration relative to total regional population 
size (Puhani, 2001; Crescenzi and Rodríguez-Pose 2008), as dependent variable.
3 In line 
with traditional migration theories we proxy pecuniary migration returns using differences 
in relative regional growth rates
4 (Haapanen, 2000) and living standards, the latter in the 
form of GDP per capita levels (Puhani, 2001; Jennissen, 2003;  Greenwood, 1997). It is 
expected that regions with limited economic dynamism (i.e. low economic growth rates) 
and relatively low standards of living or a low quality of life (Assadian, 1995) will have a 
negative net migration rate, whereas rich and economically prospering regions will attract 
migrants. 
Traditional migration models further highlight the importance of high unemployment rates
as  a push-factor  for  migration  (Todaro,  1969; Harris  and Todaro, 1970; Jackman  and 
Savouris, 1992). The likelihood of finding a job depending on a region’s job opportunities 
(vacancies)  is  proxied  by  the  regional unemployment  rate. We  expect  regions  with  low 
unemployment rates to experience migration in-flows, whereas high unemployment regions 
will have a negative net migration rate (Pissarides and McMasters, 1990; Puhani, 2001).
Given that a worker’s decision to migrate is influenced as well by a comparison of several 
forms of expected income opportunities in the home and in the host region we also include 
social welfare payments in the model (cf. Boyd, 1989; Day, 1992; Haapanen and Ritsilä, 
                                                  
3 Because of the limited inter-regional migration data provided by Eurostat (especially fo r Greece and Spain) 
this analysis follows the approach used by Crescenzi and Rodríguez-Pose (2008) and Puhani (2001) in order to 
calculate the net migration rate. The data on net migration is calculated as the population change plus deaths 
minus births. “The net migration data retrieved in this way also includes external migration” (Puhani 
2001:132) Moreover, we standardize the net migration by the average regional population. “Consequently, it is 
impossible to distinguish between national, intra-EU and extra-EU migration flows”(Crescenzi and Rodríguez-
Pose 2008: 72) 
4 Regional economic growth rates are standardized by the respective annual mean value of all the other regions
as migration is likely to be influenced by the level of income in the region of origin relative to the expected 
level of income that can be obtained somewhere else (cf. Pissarides and McMaster, 1990).11
2007). Because of the national character of most social welfare payments, we construct a 
redistributional variable combining national and regional data. The aim is to connect social 
welfare payments determined on a national scale with a region’s economic well-being. The 
resulting variable is calculated as the ratio of total annual national welfare payments over 
national GDP levels multiplied by regional GDP levels. 
Following  Rodríguez-Pose  and  Tselios  (2010), we  consider  place-based  regional 
externalities.  These  include the regional  concentration of  industries, which may  impact 
migration  flows  by  increasing  the  availability  and  remuneration  of  jobs  in a  r egion. 
However, regional agglomeration can also lead to intensified competition among workers 
(Rodríguez-Pose and Crescenzi, 2008). As a result, real wages can either increase or suffer 
from a certain downward pressure (Ottaviano and Puga, 1998). We also use total regional 
GDP in levels as a proxy for a region’s degree of industrial agglomeration. Demographic 
factors and the important role of age in influencing migration decisions (Massey et al., 
1993; Zimmermann, 2005) are represented by the percentage of total regional population 
aged between 15 and 24 years. A region’s share in this age group is standardised by the 
value for allotherregions. Social migration networks are proxied by introducing the lagged 
dependent variable as a regressor in our model. 
We construct a ‘social filter index’ (Rodríguez-Pose and Crescenzi, 2008: 56) in order to 
capture other important regional externalities which may influence migration decisions. This 
composite index accounts for the ‘territorially embedded’innovation enhancing features of a 
region. The ‘social filter’ therefore stands for “the unique combination of innovative and 
conservative  […]  elements  that favour  or deter the development of successful regional 
innovation systems” (Rodríguez-Pose, 1999: 82). Our social filter index is built upon two 
main pillars: Regional educational attainments and the composition of regional productive 12
resources. Regarding the former, education is believed to be one of the most important 
sources  in  determining  the  innovation  creating  capacity  of  a  region  (Lundvall,  1992; 
Malecki, 1997). We introduce regional education in the model as the number of persons 
with completed tertiary education relative to both, the total population of the region, and 
relative to the total number of employed people in the region. For the composition of a 
region’s pr oductive  resources, we use the  percentage of  the  labour  force employed  in 
agriculture as an indicator of low productivity. Agricultural employment may even be an 
indicator of some form of hidden unemployment, as agricultural workers show very little 
mobility and, in the European context, tend to be aged (Caselli and Coleman, 2001).
As educational attainments and the structure of productive resources are believed to be 
highly  dependent on  each  other  (Rodríguez-Pose  and  Crescenzi,  2008),  problems  of 
multicollinearity arise. We therefore use principal component analysis (PCA) in order to 
construct our social filter index with the objective “to preserve as much as possible of the 
variability of the initial information” (Rodríguez-Pose and Crescenzi, 2008a: 57). The first 
principal component accounts for 44.2% of the total variance, while the second component 
represents 35.6%. The coefficients of the education variables are, as expected, positive, 
while that of the share of employment in agriculture is negative.
The exact definition and sources of the variables included in the analyses are summarized in 
Table 1. All variables report regional data, with the exception of the national growth-rate, 
which is used in order to explicitly control for national unobserved effects and minimise
spatial  autocorrelation  (i.e.  the missing  independence  of  the residuals  of  neighbouring 13
observations (Crescenzi and Rodríguez-Pose, 2008).
5
Table 1: Data sources and exact definition of the variables
Variable Abbreviation Exact definition Source
Dependent variable
Net migration rate Mig
Net migration standardised by the 
region‘s population (per 1000 inha-
bitants)
Eurostat + authors' own 
calculations
Explanatory variables
Annual regional growth 
rate dy
Growth rate of GDP PPS per inha-
bitant standardised by the average 
annual growth rate of all regions
Eurostat + authors' own 
calculations
Level ofa region’s standard 
of  living
Yt0 Regional GDP PPS per inhabitant   Eurostat 
National social welfare 
expenditure
Socwelfare
National social expenditure/cap. over 
national GDP/cap. multiplied by 
regional GDP/cap. (all in PPS)





Regional unemployment rate 
standardised by the average annual 
unemployment rate of all regions




Ty Total regional GDP (levels – PPS) Eurostat
Region’s share of young 
people  Yo4av
People aged 15-24 years as % of total 
population and measured as the 
deviation from the annual mean value 
of  all regions
Eurostat + authors' own 
calculations
National growth rate Nay Growth rate of  national GDP per 
inhabitant
Eurostat + authors' own 
calculations
Social Filter
Agriculture employment Agri % of total employment Eurostat
Employed people with 
tertiary education Ede % of total employment  Eurostat + authors' own 
calculations
Population with tertiary 
education
Edp % of population  Eurostat + authors' own 
calculations
                                                  
5 By introducing the national growth-rate as a control variable the effect of spatial autocorrelation is minimized 
(Rodríguez-Pose and Crescenzi, 2008: 72). National growth rates are included as the ratios of  GDP (PPS) 
volume changes between the current and the previous year over the GDP (PPS) level of  the previous year.14
The model is run for the EU-15 and covers the time period between 1990 and 2006 (time 
intervals are measured in years). The analysis is based on a mixture of NUTS1
6 and NUTS2 
regions. NUTS1 are used for Belgium, Germany, and the United Kingdom, while NUTS2 
for Austria, Finland, France, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, and Sweden. 
Countries without a regional structure were excluded from the analysis.
7 In addition, some 
individual regions had also to be excluded due to inadequate data availability.
8 In total, the 
analysis is conducted for 133 regions in 12 countries.
The majority of  the data used for  this analysis  was obtained  from  the Eurostat  Regio 
database. The variables on educational achievement, in contrast, were extracted from the 
Labour Force Survey Data also provided by Eurostat. In order to calculate national growth 
rates, data from the OECD database wereused (Table 1). 
3.2 Econometric specification 
In order to test whether money is the main driving force behind EU regional migration, we 
consider a static and a dynamic time dimension. In a first set of regressions, we estimate a 
static  migration  model  using  heteroscedasticity-consistent  cluster-specific  fixed  effects 
(FEM).
9 The  cluster-specific  fixed  effects  model  introduces a  term  ci in  the  estimation 
equation which captures all unobserved patterns that vary across EU regions and that are 
constant over time. In our model these cluster-specific fixed effects account for region-
                                                  
6 Nomenclature of Territorial Unit for Statistics as defined by the European Commission 
(http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/ramon/nuts/basicnuts_regions_en.html; last visit March 12, 2010)
7 This was the case for Denmark, Ireland, and Luxemburg. The exclusion of these countries is caused by 
introducing the national growth-rate in order to control for national effects.
8 The regions excluded due to missing data are: Ceuta and Melilla, Canary Islands, all French overseas 
departments (Guadaloupe, Martinique, Guyane, Réunion), Länsi-Suomi, Trento, Açores,  and Madeira
9 The Hausman test systematically rejects random and between effects models in favour of the fixed effects 
which are strongly significant in all regressions. The high significance of fixed effects also highlights the 
importance of individual region-specific characteristics.15
specific environmental factors or reflect different propensities to migrate across regions, 
potentially  based  on  cultural  grounds  (Etzo,  2008).  Moreover,  regional  migration 
estimations  are  also  often  prone  to  endogeneity  problems.  Given  the  possibility  that 
migration may influence regional economic growth or may even shape structural features of 
regions, dependent  and  explanatory  variables  cannot be  introduced  with  the same  time 
structure. All explanatory variables are therefore lagged by, at least, one year. With this 
method  we  assume  that  migration  decisions  are  based  on  past  values and  behaviours
(Greenwood, 1985). In order to get a more complete picture of how different explanatory 
variables affect regional net migration over time, the static migration model is consecutively 
estimated  with different  lag structures  imposed on  all  independent variables. The static 
model adopts the following form:
Mig it= α  +  βdydy it-n  +  βu u it-n  +  βyo4 yo4av it-n  + βtyTy it-n  +  βyt0 Yt0 it-n  +  βdynat
dynat it-n   +  βSF SocialW elfare it-n  +  βSF SocialFilter it-n  + ci +  εit (1)
where individual variables are as described in Table 1 and α is the constant; i is the regional 
index, i є[1;133]; t is the temporal index, t є[1990;2006]; n is the number of time lags є 
[1;8]; ε is the residual term
We transform the static model into a dynamic one, in order to more explicitly account for 
potential  risks of endogeneity  and to include the  influence of  past  migration  flows or 
migratory network linkages on current migration decisions. Given the relative small number 
of  time  periods considered  and  that  the only  available  instruments  are  ‘internal’,  a 
heteroscedasticity robust ‘system Generalised Method of Moments’ (GMM) estimator is 
used in the dynamic model estimations (Roodman, 2006). The specific estimator chosen is 
the Arellano-Bover/Blundell-Bond panel data estimator in its one-step estimation version. 
We once again impose a certain lag structure on all the explanatory variables. As a result, 16
the dynamic  model  is  consecutively estimated  with  a  zero  to eight  lag structure  for all 
explanatory variables (i.e. in nine separate regressions). Regarding the specification of the 
used estimator, the lagged net migration rate is classified as endogenous in all regressions.
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Moreover, the first and the second lag have been chosen as (internal) instruments for the 
endogenous variables in all (nine) regressions. The use of more instruments with a higher 
number of time lags did not significantly change the results. 
The dynamic model adopts the following form:
Mig it+n = α + βmig Mig i,t+(n-1) + βdydy it-n +  βu u it-n + βyo4 yo4av it-n+ βtyTy it-n+ βyt0
Yt0 it-n + βdynatdynat it-n  + βSF SocialW elfare it-n + βSF SocialFilter it-n + ε it    (2)
where all variables are as described in Table 1.
4. Results
4.1 Regional net migration and pecuniary migration incentives in the EU
Figures 1 and 2 provide visual representations of the issues under analysis. Figure 3 plots 
the average regional growth rate of each region against the corresponding net migration rate
over  the  period  1990-2006.  With  the  exception  of  a  few outliers,  almost  all  data 
observations are distributed along an imaginary horizontal band, indicating that, on average,
differences in regional growth rates across EU regions cannot clearly be associated with 
significant differences in regional net migration rates alone. 
                                                  
10 In the first dynamic model regression (no lags) both the lagged net migration rate, as well as the regional 
growth rate, have been classified as endogenous variables. National growth rates of the country to which a 
particular region belongs, were introduced to minimize problems of spatial autocorrelation and are, according 
to the regression results of the static model in Table 2, not significant. Regressions (6) to (8) report significant 
positive values for the national growth rate. However, we exclude these two regressions from the interpretation 
due to problems of heteroscedasticity (regression 6) and due to a rejection of the Reset test (regression 8).17
Figure 1: EU15: Regional growth rate and net migration rate, 1990-2006
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Figure 4 depicts the relationship between regional net migration rates and regional living 
standards  (GDP  per  capita).  The  linear trend  line seems  to  indicate the presence of a 
marginally positive relationship between regional living standards and migration. But this 
relationship is not significant.
Figure 2: EU-15: Regional living standards and net migration rate 1990-2006














































































Annual average GDP per capital level, 1990 -200618
4.2 Regression Results
Static model 
This section introduces the regression results of the static heteroscedasticity robust cluster-
specific fixed effects migration model (Table 2). The results of the static model show that 
pecuniary factors tend to have a more nuanced effect on cross-regional migration in Europe 
than could have been expected according to the dominant migration theories. A region’s 
growth rate has only a significant (negative) influence on net migration movements with a 
seven or eight year lag (Table 2). This result, however, has to be interpreted with caution, 
given the results of the Reset tests for regression (7) and (8). Regional economic dynamism 
(as a proxy for higher short-term earning opportunities) thus seems to have no impact on 
individual migration decisions. A region’s standard of living, calculated as regional GDP per 
capita, however has a significant influence on the net migratory balance in all regressions. 
This result reinforces the continuous importance of a region’s standard of living in the past 
for migration decisions today. The positive influence of regional wealth on regional net 
migration movements increases slightly when accounting for values lying further in the past 
(cf. regressions (1) to (6)). The relative small size of the respective coefficients, however, 
indicates  that  the  regional  standard  of  living  (as  a  potential  sign  for  higher  expected 
earnings) is much weaker than previously assumed on the grounds of traditional migration 
theory. The combination of a relative small impact of a region’s standard of living with the 
results obtained for the regional economic growth-rate puts in perspective the proclaimed 
predominance of potential pecuniary rewards as the main lure for migrants across European 
regions.  In  addition,  regional  industry  agglomeration  which  may  under  certain 
circumstances also serve  as  a potential  alternative  indicator of  earning opportunities  is 
shown to have no continuous significant influence on regional net migration. The exceptions 
are regressions (2) and (8), where the concentration of economic activity is reported to have 19
a very weak positive influence. Overall, industry agglomeration on a regional level is not an 
essential driver of cross-regional migration in Europe. 
The  insignificance  or  weak  significance  of  the  coefficients  for  pecuniary  migration 
incentives puts the  focus  on  other  regional  aspects  which  are  likely  to be at  least  as 
important as  monetary perspectives  for  the  attractiveness of  European  regions towards 
potential migrants.
One of these factors is regional unemployment rates. They have, as expected, a significant 
negative impact on a region’s net migration rate. Regions where individuals have a lower 
probability to find a job are on average characterized by an outflow of people. However, the 
influence of the unemployment rate diminishes over time, both in terms of absolute values 
of the coefficients, as well as in terms of significance levels. Finally, the influence of the 
unemployment rate becomes completely irrelevant after regression (4). Any effect of past 
unemployment rates on current workers’ decisions to migrate disappears completely after 
four years. Hence a region’s unemployment rate is rather important for migration decisions 
in the short-run, but wholly irrelevant in the medium- and the long-run. The coefficient of 
the share of young people in a region displays a relative substantial negative influence on 
regional net migration, however only up to a lag of three years. Regions with a higher than 
average share of young people are  more  likely to  experience  a migration outflow than 
regions with an older population structure. Besides lower migration barriers and higher life-
time earning-perspectives of an ‘investment in migration’ for young movers (Borjas, 1989; 
Zimmermann, 2005), the outflow of (young) people may also reflect a higher competition 
among the young for available jobs in regions where the population is relatively young. 
Faced with high competition for available jobs, young people may therefore be forced to 
leave their home region in order to find a job somewhere else.20
Social welfare payments, measured as the ratio of national welfare spending over national 
GDP  multiplied  by  regional  GDP,  have a very  weak positive  impact on  net  migration. 
However, a significant influence could not be reported for regressions (4), (6) and (7). This 
could highlight the limited time horizon (around three years) of the influence of past social 
welfare  spending  on  current  migration  decisions.  Put  differently,  regions  with  a  well 
developed social system tend to attract migrants only in the short-run.
Finally,  the  ‘social  filter  index’,  describing  the  ‘territorially  embedded’  innovation 
enhancing character of a region, shows a positive correlation with the regional net migration 
rate. Its continuous impact in all eight regressions points to the general high importance of 
(innovation-enhancing) social  conditions  in  order to attract  migrants.  Hence  territorially 
embedded characteristics, such as the existence of a favourable educational environment 
and the associated opportunities for migrants to increase their own productivity through 
interaction with each other (Rudd, 2000; Acemoglu and Angrist, 2001; Di Addario and 
Patachini, 2008) seem crucial in the potential of any European region to attract migrants. 
Deconstructing  the social  filter  into  its  individual  components  yields  interesting  results. 
First, among the factors that compose the social filter index, educational variables are highly 
important.  The  level  of  education  of  the employed  labour  force has a strong positive 
influence (0.7174) on the filter index. The presence of a high-tech or high-skilled labour 
force tends to attract people, once all other factors are controlled for. These findings support 
to some extent the hypothesis that highly educated people are more likely to move to areas 
with  an already highly skilled  labour  force  and  with  industries  requiring highly-skilled 
labour.  People  eligible  to work  in  such  industries  will find (better  paid)  jobs  and  are 21
therefore more likely to migrate. The educational level of the total regional population has 
also a positive influence (although not as strong (0.0514)). The slight positive impact of the 
latter variable may signal a positive influence of a good regional educational system on net 
migration movements. Second, the composition of productive resources in a region, proxied 
by the relative number of people employed in agriculture has a negative influence in the 
framework of the social filter (-0.6948) and impacts net migration negatively. Regions with 
a more  backward  sectoral  composition  (high  percentage of  workers  in  the  agricultural 
sector) tend therefore to lose people.2
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Table 2 - EU15: Static heteroscedasticity robust fixed effects regression of the regional net migration rate
Regression (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Number of lags used for all explanatory 
variables lag 1 lag 2 lag 3 lag 4 lag 5 lag 6 lag 7 lag 8
constant 7.771033 6.17128 2.257153 -0.7504549 -3.974604 -13.02831* -17.57638** -17.83562**
(4.825125) (4.809819) (5.167822) (5.533122) (6.047764) (7.446514) (8.36357) (8.264751)
Regional unemployment rate (u) -4.564859*** -3.563174*** -2.338552 ** -1.628701* -0.7461349 0.7695321* 2.029845* 2.156954*
(0.9732543) (1.003529) (1.023599) (0.9842363) (0.9867643) (1.035306) (1.123488) (1.208864)
Regional growth rate (dy) -0.0066169 -0.0424577 -0.034256 -0.0028028 -0.0702049 -0.0802821 -0.142259*** -0.1595286***
(0.0586217) (0.0486346) (0.0432929) (0.0455806) (0.0515477) (-1.82) (0.0493105) (0.0564483)
Region's share of young people (yo4av) -7.238715* -7.57828** -7.64933* -6.733013 -4.782299 -1.265705 -0.7982334 -0.7228066
(3.77242) (3.750799) (4.091144) (4.793315) (5.551373) (5.990049) (6.328007) (6.249891)
National growth rate (dynat) -0.1100919 0.0891629 0.0782111 0.0534249 0.100899 -0.1535336* 0.0522028 0.2164979***
(0.1092639) (0.0982809) (0.0896191) (0.0810656) (0.086289) (0.0926435) (0.0832721) (0.0809474)
Regional wealth (yto) 0.0003883* 0.0003876* 0.0005176 ** 0.0005858** 0.0006194*** 0.0008518*** 0.0008462** 0.0007449**
(0.000238) (0.0002324) (0.000246) (0.0002432) (0.0002374) (0.0002872) (0.0003324) (0.0003429)
Regional industry agglomeration (ty) 0.00000259 0.00000344* 0.0000165 0.0000261 0.0000227 0.000049 0.0001259 0.0001688*
(0.0000381) (0.0000404) (0.0000415) (0.0000464) (0.0000558) (0.0000705) (0.0000823) (0.0000845)
Social Filter 0.1297378 * 0.2210792 *** 0.2556374*** 0.2729565*** 0.3146224*** 0.3309161*** 0.2892611** 0.3066836**
(0.0768229) (0.0783195) (0.0785592) (0.0809718) (0.1147081) (0.1158337) (0.1284978) (0.1269575)
Social welfare spending 0.00001*** 0.0000112 *** 0.0000129*** 0.00000623 0.00000819*** 0.00000400 0.00000363 -0.0000115*
(0.00000322) (0.00000308) (0.00000350) (0.00000393) (0.00000274) (0.00000281) (0.00000297) (0.00000622)
R
2 within 0.1942 0.1877 0.1865 0.1703 0.1464 0.1252 0.1219 0.1183
F (p-value) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000





14.3037 8.73 7.4087 8.7048 10.4788 19.1488 14.208 11.6352
RESET 0.2367 0.1356 0.0773 0.2944 0.8915 0.4237 0.0003 0.0002
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Robust standard errors in parentheses.2
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Table 3 - EU15: Dynamic heteroscedasticity robust one-step GMM regression of the regional net migration rate - two instrumented lags
Regression (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Number of lags used for all 
explanatory variables
no lag lag 1 lag 2 lag 3 lag 4 lag 5 lag 6 lag 7 lag 8
constant 2.026632 0.497106 0.0599503 0.4943516 0.4021109 0.0875911 -1.249148 -3.188772 -2.41491
(1.410433) (1.428338) (2.319269) (3.098992) (3.819844) (4.548822) (5.203012) (5.65259) (6.156975)
Lagged net migration rate (mig-
n) .7670997*** 0.7818215*** 0.6872863*** 0.5965996*** 0.5229773*** 0.4155296*** 0.3285547*** 0.3494587*** 0.2652046**
(0.0528931) (0.0509049) (0.0585061) (0.0651047) (0.068827) (0.0782147) (0.0863126) (0.1033346) (0.1133115)
Regional unemployment rate (u) -0.5082866** -0.5143027*** -0.2846236 -0.0398135 -0.0461411 0.1237908 0.3744447 0.9633254 1.033216
(0.219775) (0.1857405) (0.2609468) (0.3155803) (0.3920013) (0.4807951) (0.6147681) (0.7549092) (0.8415774)
Regional growth rate (dy) 0.1095681 0.0327961 -0.023138 0.0142711 0.0457977 -0.0730995 -0.0677403 -0.0963383* -0.0753624
(0.0664606) (0.0541181) (0.03674) (0.0331796) (0.0399761) (0.0476767) (0.0519562) (0.0491541) (0.049852)
Region’s share of young people 
(yo4av)
0.119927 0.8972873 1.265364 1.227045 1.760881 2.133658 3.83484 4.686266 4.481951
(1.16584) (1.193867) (1.956208) (2.670298) (3.34024) (4.083319) (4.76769) (5.184939) (5.6592)
National growth rate (dynat) -0.1801297** 0.1457491** 0.3494961*** 0.2687425*** 0.2893596*** 0.5357573*** 0.2840292** 0.4083757*** 0.4369081***
(0.0833448) (0.0699743) (0.0701594) (0.0799236) (0.0917951) (0.0866036) (0.1261511) (0.1167821) (0.1060938)
Regional wealth (yto) -0.0000437** -0.0000241 -0.0000351 -0.0000486 -0.000059 -0.0000593 -0.0000353 0.00000136 -0.00000292
(0.0000199) (0.0000188) (0.0000286) (0.0000364) (0.0000433) (0.0000516) (0.0000607) (0.0000683) (0.0000736)
Regional industry 
agglomeration (ty)
-0.00000185 -0.00000144 -0.00000219 -0.00000322 -0.00000323 -0.00000342 -0.00000424 -0.00000491 -0.00000519
(0.00000113) (0.00000110) (0.00000177) (0.00000234) (0.00000289) (0.00000350) (0.00000399) (0.00000430) (0.00000468)
Social Filter 0.0299759** 0.0162523* 0.0410525*** 0.0492257** 0.050931** 0.0494449 0.0463528 0.0324796 0.0359372
(0.0126348) (0.0095079) (0.0139621) (0.0192543) (0.0244731) (0.0321293) (0.037777) (0.040588) (0.0453245)
Social welfare spending 0.00000543 0.00000523* 0.00000252 0.0000455* 0.00000255 0.00000994 -0.00000261 0.00000193 -0.0000184***
(0.00000306) (0.00000285) (0.00000193) (0.00000270) (0.00000342) (0.00000227) (0.00000203) (0.00000316) (0.00000691)
Hansen-J 1.000 0.642 0.002 0.003 0.001 0.004 0.001 0.004 0.003
AR (1) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.067 0.167 0.016 0.003 0.197 0.815
AR (2) 0.099 0.079 0.337 0.148 0.106 0.095 0.019 0.028 0.020
F (p-value) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.004 0.000 0.000
observations 2078 2073 1940 1807 1674 1541 1408 1280 1152
nb of instruments 280 145 129 114 100 87 74 63 53
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Robust standard errors in parentheses.2
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Table 4 - Interregional net migration within EU countries -static heteroscedasticity robust fixed effects regression, all explanatory variables 
lagged once
Regression (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Country Austria France Germany Italy Netherlands Spain United Kingdom
constant -83.63767 -64.81061** 9.125145 25.46796* 47.58143** -54.88995 -29.88974
(8.652927) (29.96996) (8.549768) (13.36205) (20.10522) (18.11079) (6.790288)
Regional unemployment 
rate (u) 4.885608 2.696408* -7.734461*** -3.78297*** 7.172193** -4.572593** 2.153263*
(3.214626) (1.402103) (2.379432) (1.305633) (3.068717) (1.929789) (1.153921)
Regional growth rate 
(dy) 0.2450643 0.0938737 0.3425758*** -0.0087098 -0.2752234** -0.3773303** 0.489592
(0.171445) (0.0757615) (0.0596319) (0.0728909) (0.1096242) (0.148618) (0.1844337)
Region's share of young 
people (yo4av) 77.67583*** 21.37884 13.3611** -14.60783** -48.77269** 25.91782** 35.89969***
(8.826543) (21.23471) (5.332698) (6.967394) (17.89088) (10.61278) (7.251543)
Regional wealth (yto) 0.0000529 0.002826** 0.0006979 -0.0007325 0.0000634 0.0031733** -0.0008566
(0.0003942) (0.0010283) (0.0005645) (0.0005131) (0.000648) (0.001264) (0.000738)
Regional industry 
agglomeration (ty) -0.0001861 -0.0000535 -0.0000696 0.0001511** 0.000067 0.0002893* 0.0000316
(0.0003942) (0.0000872) (0.0000381) (0.000059) (0.0001481) (0.0001645) (0.0000713)
Social Filter 0.0465253 -0.5175668 * -1.183791** 0.04272679*** -0.2105581 -0.2706229 0.2324903
(0.36602859) (0.299026) (0.5198335) (0.0714163) (0.1644734) (0.307724) (0.2645966)
Social welfare spending -0.000016** 0.00000935 -0.00002** 0.0000177** 0.0000359 0.00000766 -0.0000149
(0.00000698) (0.0000289) (0.00000758) (0.00000729) (0.0000239) (0.0001122) (0.00000764)
R
2within 0.5294 0.37 0.5527 0.6266 0.326 0.6803 0.1317
F (p-value) 0.0001 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0024 0.0000 0.0000




2) 8.28 22.6336 29.952 72.8688 19.1232 25.4464 4.3968
Normality test (p-value) 0.0058 0.0000 0.0902 0.0021 0.0021 0.2696 0.0000
RESET 0.2087 0.9405 0.8784 0.0032 0.5004 0.0199 0.9072
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Robust standard errors in parentheses.Dynamic model 
The main advantage of the dynamic over the static model is the possibility of introducing the 
past migration trajectory as a means to control for path dependency and for the presence of 
social networks, as well as addressing issues of endogeneity, by means of a heteroscedasticity
robust ‘system GMM’ estimation.  The lagged dependent variable is therefore introduced as a 
regressor. According to the regression results reported in Table 3, past migration flows are 
extremely significant in all nine regressions (at a 1% level of significance) and havea positive
and over time declining influence on current net migration. Past migration trends are thus 
more relevant in the short-run than in the medium-run. This result confirms the presence of a 
certain ‘path dependency’, meaning that current migration flows towards a particular region 
are determined by chain migration effects and by the migration destination decision of earlier 
migrants (Massey and Gracia, 1987; Bauer and Zimmermann, 1997; Shah and Menon 1999). 
In other words, the higher the number of immigrants in a particular host region, the higher the 
migration flows towards this particular host region. However, network effects among migrants 
seem based on more recent migration flows than those farther in the past, as signalled by the 
declining coefficient once time lags are added (cf. regression (1) to (9), Table 3).
The high and positive influence of past migration hides the risk that this variable may have an 
impact on the significance of the results for all the other explanatory variables reported in 
Table  2. Hence,  the  remaining results of  the  dynamic  model should be considered  with 
caution, especially – according to the misspecification performed tests – the coefficients for 
observations lying further in the past (i.e. for regressions with more than one time lag – see
Table 3). As a result, the interpretation of the dynamic model will mostly be concentrated on 
regressions (1) and (2).26
The coefficients for the regional growth rate and the regional standards of living tend to 
confirm the findings of the static model, where both indicators were shown to have only a 
weak economic impact.The same can be said for regional industry agglomeration.
Unemployment, by  contrast,  has  a strong significance  in  regressions  (1)  and (2)  of the 
dynamic model, pointing to a negative short-run correlation with the net migration flows.  The 
estimation results in Table 3 further show that the regional ratio of young people relative to 
other  regions has no significant  influence on  regional  net  migration  movements  for  the 
dynamic  model.  This stands  in contradiction  with the  results of the static model. Social 
welfare spending, on  the  contrary,  is significant  in  regressions  (2)  and  (4)  leading to the 
conclusion that the latter might have a small influence on migration in the short-run rather 
than in the long-run.
A further interesting result of the dynamic analysis is that, compared to the static model, the 
national growth rate is strongly significant over time (significance levels between 1% and 5% 
in all regressions). It shows moreover, a positive relationship with the regional net migration 
rate– with the exception of regression (1) – indicating that the level of past national economic 
growth rates is of some relevance for current cross-border migration decisions. This could 
point to the conclusion that national economic growth rates are a much more visible wage 
signal than their regional counterparts. Finally, the social filter is also in once again strongly 
significant in regressions (1) to (5), implying that the same conclusions can be drawn as for 
the static perspective. Its positive influence is, however, approximately five to eight times 
weaker compared to the estimation results obtained for the static model.27
Cross-country comparison
In order to get an idea of whether significant differences regarding inter-regional migration 
patterns exist among European Member States, we conduct the static analysis for individual 
countries. The results of Table 4 point to the existence of interesting cross-country differences 
in the determinants of migration.
In Germany, the Netherlands, and Spain – and, in contrast to the EU-wide results – regional 
economic growth exerts a significant influence on the regional net migration rate. However, 
this  influence  is positive  only  in  Germany,  reporting  that  German  regions  with  higher 
economic growth rates tend to attract people. According to the regression results, growing 
regions in Austria, Italy, and Britain tend to lose people, possibly reflecting a preference for 
commuting or the choice to locate in neighbouring regions rather than in the growth-centres 
itself. The second pecuniary migration indicator (GDP per capita) exerts only a small positive 
influence  in  France  and  in  Spain, putting the  limited  effect  of pecuniary  incentives  as
migration drivers further in perspective.
Regional unemployment has a significant impact on regional net migration movements in 
almost all EU member states, although not always in the expected direction (cf. France, the 
Netherlands, and the UK). The high significance across almost all EU member states of a 
region’s share of  young  people further  highlight  the  importance  of a  region’s age  and 
demographic structures for migration. The overall direction of youth on migration decisions is
however less clear-cut. While regions in Italy and the Netherlands with a high share of young 
persons tend to lose people, ‘young’ regions in Austria, Germany, Spain, and the UK tend to 
attract people.28
The results for Italy, furthermore, tend to substantiate anecdotal evidence of considerable 
South-North migration movements. Relatively sluggish and inflexible labour markets in the 
Southern part of Italy combined with a relatively young population structure and hence a 
greater competition for available jobs among young workers may have lead to a significant 
outflow of (young) people from Southern Italian regions. This tends to be corroborated by a 
positive  influence of  regions  with  a  high  degree  of industry-agglomeration,  lower 
unemployment, favourable socio-economic conditions, and a well functioning social security 
net (i.e. North-Italian regions) on potential movers.
Regional migration flows in France seem to be only determined by regional unemployment 
rates, the socio-economic structure of a region, and, to a lesser degree, by regional living 
standards. Similar results can be reported for Spain and the UK with the difference that in 
Spain  and the  UK  a region’s demographic structure seems to play  a much stronger  role. 
Favourable socio-economic conditions and regional living standards (the latter only for the 
UK) have, however, no role for inter-regional migration in these two countries.
Inter-regional migration in Germany is, apart from the percentage of young people, regional 
economic growth and unemployment rates, also influenced by the socio-economic character 
of a region. The overall results for Germany may therefore point to more dynamic regions in 
the Southern and Western parts of Germany (with relatively more young people) which tend 
to be more attractive to potential movers than less dynamic regions with an older population 
structure, such as the former East German Länder. Social welfare spending has a weak but 
significant negative influence on regional net migration, pointing to a limited influence of
social welfare expenditures for nation-wide migration.29
4.3 Robustness
A number of tests have been performed in order to assess the robustness of the static and 
dynamic migration models. Most of them are reported below the respective regression results 
in Table 2 and Table 3. Regarding the static model (in Table 2) the R-square within estimates 
emphasise the general goodness-of-fit of the static model. The F-test of joint insignificance of 
the  explanatory  variables  is i n all  cases  strongly  rejected  at  all  the  relevant  levels  of 
significance. In addition, even if it was not absolutely necessary, as heteroscedasticity robust 
estimators  have  been  used,  a  Breusch-Pagan  heteroscedasticity test  has been  computed. 
Almost all test statistics are below the critical value (see Table 2), showing no sign of the 
presence of heteroscedasticity. Several ‘Reset’ tests have also been computed in order to take 
into account potential problems of linear misspecification. Most of the respective ‘Reset’ p-
values are above the 5% level of significance indicating a general good linear specification of 
the static model.
11
In  order to test for  multicollinearity among  the explanatory variables,  Va riance  Inflation 
Factor (V .I.F) tests have been performed on pooled-data versions of the eight different static 
model specifications. Given that our model is based on a panel-data estimation with non-
negligible individual fixed effects, the V .I.F test based on pooled regressions can only deliver 
limited results. The tests do not report multicollinearity for the static model, a result which is 
corroborated by a correlation matrix in which no explanatory variable is strongly correlated to 
any other. 
The estimation results of the dynamic panel-data heteroscedasticity-consistent ‘system GMM’ 
regressions are presented in Table 3. The most important difference with respect to the static 
                                                  
11 The only exceptions are the Reset test results of the 7
th and 8
th regression, which may signal that most of the 
variables lose their influence on net migration after a period of 6 years.30
model estimated above is the introduction of the lagged dependent variable as a regressor. The 
misspecification  tests  are  reported  in  the  bottom  half  of  Table  3. The  F-test  of  joint 
insignificance of the explanatory variables is in all cases strongly rejected at a 5% level. The 
p-values of the Hansen-J statistic reported in Table 3 are, only for the first two regressions 
using a zero and a one year lag structure, above the 10% significance threshold (p-values are 
equal  to  1.000  and  0.642  respectively).  This  reflects  a certain  difficulty  to  find  robust 
instruments for the other regressions.
12
In  addition,  we  perform  an  Arellano  and  Bond  (1991)  test  in  order  to  detect  any 
“autocorrelation in the idiosyncratic disturbance term εit” (Roodman, 2006: 31). The p-values 
of the autocorrelation tests (H0: non-correlated error terms) of first and second order are 
reported in Table 3. The tests for first and second order autocorrelation in the error terms 
deliver for all nine regressions mixed results. However, in all regressions except regression 
number (7) either the first or the second lag can be used as a valid instrument. Regarding 
potential multicollinearity issues, a similar approach has been chosen for the dynamic model 
as  for  the  regressions  based  on  the  static  model.  The  results  reflect  no  concern  for 
multicollinearity.
The results of thestatic country based estimations are given in Table 4. Misspecification tests, 
reported at the bottom of the table, generally speak in favour of the robustness of the results;
however, some results have to be interpreted with some caution given the features of some of 
the test statistics.
                                                  
12 Another small caveat of the regression results reported in Table 3 is the large number of instruments 
(especially in the first two regressions with 1 and 2 lags respectively) compared to the number of individuals 
(133). According to Roodman (2006), too many instruments can lead to an overfit of the endogenous variables 
which may be indicated by a perfect Hansen statistic of 1.000 (Roodman, 2006: 40).31
5. Conclusion 
The main purpose of this paper has been to assess the role of pecuniary factors in comparison 
to other alternatives as a major driver for migration. Given thesubstantial growth and income 
disparities across EU’s regions, we examined the question of whether regional migration in 
the EU follows money and contrasted these findings against other potential migration drivers. 
The impact of money and other relevant factors on migration has been analysed by means of a 
static and dynamic migration model covering 133 European regions and a time horizon of 17 
years. 
The combined results of the static and dynamic models tend to cast doubts about the relevance 
of  traditional migration  theory  for  recent cross-regional  migration  trends  in E urope. The 
results give little support to the idea of migration following regional wealth or economic 
dynamism. It is therefore hardly possible to claim that migration across EU’s regions mainly 
follows the money, in contradiction with most traditional migration theories where money is 
reported to play an essential role in shaping individualmigration decisions. The findings may 
however also point to the fact that substantial migration barriers, in the EU, still exist which 
may result in a likely reduction of possible monetary rewards to migration. 
The results, however, suggest that other factors, such as the likelihood of finding a job, past 
migration trends and the presence of migrants from a similar origin, social security related 
aspects, or the availability of a good educational system and further human capital related 
regional characteristics, are decisive elements for inter-regional migration across the EU’s 
regions. The influence of these factors also varies according to the time frame considered. 
Whereas some – mainly  unemployment,  past  migration  trends, and  welfare expending –
operate fundamentally in the short-run, others, such as the presence of an adequate social 32
filter, have an association with net migration trends which is longer lasting. In addition, the 
significant positive results ofthe social filter index reinforce the view that it maybe easier for 
high-skilled rather than for low-skilled workers to find jobs in other regions and, thus, to 
move. This may also hide the fact that highly educated people are much more sensitive to 
inter-regional wage and employment differentials. 
The study has additionally revealed important differences among EU countries in the factors 
that determine migration patterns. While in some countries pecuniary migration incentives 
seem to exert some influence on inter-regional net migration, this is not the case in most
others. Unemployment and youth generally play a more important role in almost all Member 
States analysed.
This paper set out to reveal some new insights on migration determining factors on an EU-
wide regional level. It may, however, also be understood as a call for further research in order 
to develop policy recommendations concerning inter-regional mobility in the EU and beyond. 
Further studies could  be conducted by  means of gravity  models  in  order  to directly  link 
sending and receiving regions. In addition, it would also be interesting to see how migration 
movements are influenced by the size of regional manufacturing and services sectors, as well 
as, to explicitly investigate the role of human capital and education on EU-wide regional net 
migration rates.33
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